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NOTES
Suter v. Artist M. and Statutory Remedies Under Section 1983:
Alteration Without Justification
[Sipeak what you think today in words as hard as cannon
balls, and tomorrow speak what tomorrow thinks in hard words
again, though it contradict everything you said today. '
When someone acting "under color" of state law violates an individ-
ual's rights under the Federal "Constitution and laws," 42 U.S.C.
§ 19832 provides the wronged individual with a private right of action
against the guilty party. Commonly known as § 1983, Congress enacted
this legislation in the 1870s as part of its Reconstruction legislation.4
The Supreme Court has stated that Congress's intent in passing § 1983
was to override "invidious" state legislation against individual rights, to
offer a remedy where state laws were inadequate to protect those rights,
and to provide a cause of action "where the state remedy, although ade-
quate in theory, was not available in practice."5 In 1980, the Court held
that § 1983 could support a private cause of action for violations by state
officials of rights protected by federal statutes as well as the Constitu-
I. RALPH W. EMERSON, SELF-RELIANCE 33 (Gene Dekovic ed., 1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). In pertinent part, § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. (emphasis added). What is now § 1983 was enacted as § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)) (also known as the
Ku Klux Klan Act).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 14 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Section one of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 read as § 1983 does now, except that the phrase "and laws" was
not included. See id. at 15 (Powell, J., dissenting). Congress added the phrase "and laws" in
1874. See id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
5. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). The Monroe Court cited
legislative history demonstrating that § 1983's predecessor was intended to address the consti-
tutional problem of states' denying "equal protection of the law" to African Americans. Id. at
173-75. While addressing equal protection violations was a critical factor in Congress's enact-
ment of the provision that evolved into § 1983, the Supreme Court nonetheless has refused to
restrict § 1983's applicability to violations of civil rights protected by the Constitution.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 6-7; see infra note 76 and accompanying text.
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tion.6 Since that time, the Court has struggled to determine which fed-
eral statutes private parties may enforce under § 1983. v
In a 1990 case, the Supreme Court consolidated into a multi-faceted
test the factors it had traditionally considered to determine when a fed-
eral statute is enforceable under § 1983.8 The Court recently departed
from this test for judging a federal statute's enforceability in Suter v. Art-
ist M.,' which illustrates a fundamental change in the Court's § 1983
analysis." At issue in Artist M. was a provision of the Adoption Assist-
ance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA, or "the Act").11 The
Court held that private parties cannot enforce the "reasonable efforts"
clause of the AACWA12 under § 1983.13
Artist M.'s practical impact on the foster care system will not be
6. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4; for further discussion of Thiboutot, see infra notes 71-77 and
accompanying text. Prior to Thiboutot, § 1983 served only as a remedy for denials of constitu-
tional rights; while the Thiboutot majority cited several cases supporting the proposition that
§ 1983 should be available to remedy violations of federal statutes by state officials, see
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4-5, Thiboutot was the first case to state this proposition as a matter of
law.
7. The Court has addressed § 1983's application to several federal statutes. See, e.g.,
infra note 78 (Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act), notes 83-84
(Clean Water Act and Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act), note 87 (Education
of the Handicapped Act), note 89 (Brooke Amendment to Housing Act), note 96 (National
Labor Relations Act), and notes 105-09 (Medicaid Act) and accompanying text.
S. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990). According to Wilder, if a
federal statute was intended to benefit the plaintiffs who brought suit (the first prong of the
test), then the statute creates enforceable rights under § 1983 so long as it reflects a binding
obligation-rather than a mere legislative preference (the second prong)-and it is not too
"vague" or "amorphous" for the judiciary to enforce (the third prong). Id. at 509. While the
Court had recognized the relevance of these three factors in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City
of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989), the Court did not refer the factors in a discernable
"test" until Wilder. 496 U.S. at 509; see infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text (discussion
the test enunciated in Wilder), notes 96, 98 (further discussing Golden State).
9. 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
10. See infra notes 56, 152-54, 180-93, 195-216 and accompanying text.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679a (1988). The AACWA was Congress's attempt to ad-
dress the deficiencies of the American foster care system, including foster care agencies' de-
monstrable ineffectiveness in preventing the fragmentation of families. Alice C. Shotton,
Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L.
REv. 223, 223-24 (1989); see infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. The Act offers states
federal reimbursement for foster care and adoption services that comply with certain condi-
tions, one of which is the submission of a plan demonstrating that the implementing agency
makes "reasonable efforts" to avoid removing children from their homes and to facilitate re-
uniting families after necessary removals. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670, 671(a)(15). See infra text accom-
panying note 35 for the specific language of the reasonable-efforts requirement. The
reasonable-efforts provision is one of 17 requirements for a state's plan; others include the
development of case plans for children (number 16) and the reporting of suspected physical or
mental abuse of a child (number 9). 42 U.S.C. § 671(a).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15).
13. Artist M, 112 S. Ct. at 1370.
negligible, since the decision eradicates any deterrence private plaintiff
suits might have had on agencies administering poor foster care serv-
ices.14 That consideration notwithstanding, the most far-reaching impact
Artist M. will have is on § 1983 jurisprudence.15 The Supreme Court's
denial of a private remedy under § 1983 is not extraordinary in itself;
after all, the Court has denied private plaintiffs remedies under § 1983
for violations of federal statutes before. 6 The Court's analysis and rea-
soning in Artist M., however, is unusual.17 The Artist M. Court ignored
its traditional method for analyzing whether a federal statute creates
rights enforceable under § 1983.18 Most important, the Court ignored its
general presumption in favor of finding a statute enforceable pursuant to
§ 1983; under the traditional inquiry, the plaintiff has a private right of
action under § 1983 unless the defendant demonstrates that Congress did
not intend a private remedy through § 1983 for violation of the federal
statute in question.19 The Artist M. Court effectively shifted the burden
of production regarding legislative intent from the defendant to the plain-
tiff,2" thereby making it far more difficult for a private plaintiff to demon-
strate that a federal statute is enforceable under § 1983.21 As Justice
Blackmun noted in his dissent, the Artist M. majority arguably "changed
the rules of the game" without acknowledging, much less justifying, that
change.22
This Note outlines the purpose and language of the reasonable-ef-
forts provision of the AACWA.23 Next, the Note briefly explains the
Artist M. Court's resolution of the § 1983 question and describes the dis-
senting Justices' arguments.24 The Note traces the basic analytical
framework developed by the Court (before Artist M.) with regard to
14. See infra notes 149, 222-25 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 152-57, 195-216 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 152-93 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 56, 154-57 and accompanying text.
19. Section 1983 arguably creates a presumption that federal statutory rights are enforcea-
ble through private action unless Congress specifically has foreclosed enforcement under
§ 1983 within the statute at issue. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508-09 n.9
(1990); see infra note 191 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
22. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1377 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text. This Note focuses on the Artist M.
Court's ruling on the § 1983 question. Artist M. also addressed the enforceability of the rea-
sonable-efforts clause under an "implied remedy" theory. See infra notes 59-60, 100, 186-93
and accompanying text for discussion of the implied remedy issue. Although the Court's reso-
lution of the implied remedy theory in Artist M. is worthy topic for further study, it is not the
focal point of this Note.
24. See infra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
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§ 1983,25 and then analyzes the Artist M opinion in light of prior § 1983
jurisprudence.26 The Note concludes that the Artist M. decision does not
embody sound legal principles grounded in ample precedent so much as
it represents the Court's desire to protect state autonomy and restrict the
use of § 1983.27 Finally, this Note predicts how lower courts may react
to Artist M.'s novel approach to applying § 1983 to federal statutes.28
The statutory provision that served as a catalyst for altering § 1983
jurisprudence in Artist M. represents Congress's attempt to address a se-
vere social problem. During the five years preceding the passage of the
AACWA, members of Congress heard testimony about how neglected
and abused children were treated by the foster care system. 29 The legis-
lators learned that children in foster care were becoming "more and
more disturbed" as they moved from one foster home to the next, unable
to return to their natural families or to move into adoptive ones.30 Faced
with the magnitude of this problem and encouraged by the success of
experimental programs that were managing to keep "crisis-ridden fami-
lies" together,31 Congress passed the AACWA in 1980 in an attempt to
"lessen the emphasis on foster care placement and to encourage greater
efforts to find permanent homes for children either by making it possible
for them to return to their own families or by placing them in adoptive
homes."' 32 Congress hoped to encourage a higher quality of care for chil-
dren in dysfunctional families by offering federal reimbursement to foster
25. See infra notes 70-150 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 152-93 and accompanying text. This Note also examines the state
courts' general confusion over how to define "reasonable efforts" and how and when to evalu-
ate an agency's efforts. See infra notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 129-33, 194-216 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
29. Shotton, supra note 11, at 224. The foster care crisis has hardly abated. Almost
500,000 children lived in foster homes in 1991, an increase of more than 50% since 1982; some
predict that that number will rise to over one million by the year 2000. Pat Wingert & Eloise
Salholz, Irreconcilable Differences, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992, at 84-85. The recent "Greg-
ory K" case, in which a 12 year-old boy successfully sued his natural mother for divorce after
years of "bouncing" between her homes and those of foster families, has drawn national atten-
tion to the foster care system's failure to prevent the unnecessary removal of children from
their homes or facilitate the successful reunion of those families forced to resort to temporary
foster care. Id. at 84.
30. Shotton, supra note 11, at 224.
31. Id. (citing EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUND., KEEPING FAMILIES TOGETHER:
THE CASE FOR FAMILY PRESERVATION 8-13 (1985)). One of the more prominent programs
demonstrating this success was Homebuilders, a Washington state program providing "inten-
sive [family] services" that consisted of 24-hour staff availability and at-home services, rather
than requiring the family to come to the agency's office. Id.
32. S. REP. No. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448,
1450.
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care agencies that focused their services on several purposes,33 some of
which included helping families identify and resolve their problems-
rather than separating children from their parents unnecessarily-and
returning children to their natural homes whenever possible.34
Section 671(a) of the AACWA outlines requirements of state foster
care and adoption assistance plans, including the requirement at issue in
Artist M.:
In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this
part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary [of Health
and Human Resources] which-
(3) provides that the plan shall be in effect in all political
subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be
mandatory upon them;...
[and] (15) effective October 1, 1983, provides that, in each
case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement
of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for
removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible
for the child to return to his home.35
The conflict over the reasonable-efforts provision which culminated
in the Artist M. decision began in Illinois. The Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) receives and investigates reports
of neglected or abused children.36 When its investigations indicate that
administrative and judicial action is necessary to protect the child's wel-
fare, DCFS files petitions in its juvenile court.37 In some cases, the juve-
nile court awards temporary child custody to DCFS; in other cases, a
child's parents retain custody under protective order.38 Like all states,
Illinois may obtain federal reimbursement under the AACWA for a per-
centage of its foster care services. 39 To receive and retain these federal
funds, the state must present a plan for approval by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.' This plan must meet several qualifica-
tions, one of which is that the plan contain a reasonable-efforts require-
33. 42 U.S.C. § 625(a) (1988).
34. Id. § 625(a)(1)(C), (D).
35. Id. § 671(a)(3), (15) (emphasis added).
36. Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980, 982-83 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Suter v.
Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
37. Id. The "juvenile court" is the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois. Id. at 983.
38. Id. at 982-83.
39. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 672-674, 675(4)(A).
40. Id. §§ 670, 671.
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ment governing state foster care agencies.41
The Artist M. plaintiffs, wards of the Illinois juvenile court,42 filed a
class action against the director and guardianship administrator of
DCFS.4 3 The plaintiffs alleged that the agency had failed to assign work-
ers to their cases promptly enough and had neglected to reassign cases
promptly when caseworkers left the agency.' According to the com-
plaint, DCFS violated the plaintiffs' rights under the AACWA by failing
to make reasonable efforts to avoid the removal of children from their
homes and to reunite families after these removals.45 The plaintiffs sued
under § 1983, which serves as a private remedy for violations of a federal
statute if the statute meets certain criteria.46
Granting the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, the trial court or-
dered DCFS to assign caseworkers to all cases no longer than three
working days after either (1) the juvenile court case was first heard, or (2)
an assigned caseworker relinquished any aspect of the case.4 7 The Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the injunctive order,48 resting its
decision on the Supreme Court's most recent articulation of the test for
41. Id. § 671(a)(15). The plan must require agencies administering foster care services to
avoid removing children from the home and to return children to their homes after necessary
separations. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 35 for the full text of the reasonable-efforts
provision.
42. ArtistM., 917 F.2d at 983. The plaintiff class raising the § 1983 claim was made up of
"[c]hildren who are or will be the subjects of neglect, dependency or abuse petitions.., who
are or will be in the custody of [DCFS] or in a home under DCFS supervision [by Court order]
... and who are now or will be without a DCFS caseworker for a significant period of time."
Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1364 n.4 (quoting Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D.
Ill. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct.
1360 (1992)).
43. In the original action, the director was Gordon Johnson and the guardianship admin-
istrator was Gary Morgan. Artist M., 917 F.2d at 982. When the case reached the Supreme
Court, Sue Suter had taken over as director of DCFS, Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1364; hence, the
case name changed between the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court decisions.
44. Artist M., 917 F.2d at 983.
45. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988).
46. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1980). To be enforceable under § 1983, a federal
statute must create enforceable rights in the plaintiffs; furthermore, suit under § 1983 to en-
force the statutory right must not have been precluded expressly by Congress. Wilder v. Vir-
ginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990). According to Wilder's three-prong test, when a
statute was intended to benefit the putative plaintiffs, it creates enforceable rights unless it fails
to create a "binding obligation" (i.e., it reflects a mere "congressional preference") or it is so
"vague and amorphous" that it cannot be competently enforced by the judiciary. Id. at 509.
See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of these criteria for
determining if § 1983 applies.
47. Artist M., 917 F.2d at 984. The injunction was later amended to include a monitoring
mechanism, requiring the DCFS to report weekly on its compliance with the first injunctive
order. Id.
48. Id. at 992.
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determining whether a federal statute is enforceable under § 1983.4" The
court held that because the AACWA was clearly "intended to benefit"
the plaintiffs in this action, and since the right asserted by the plaintiffs
was not too "vague and amorphous" for courts to enforce, the Act's rea-
sonable-efforts provision created an enforceable right.50 The Seventh
Circuit also agreed that the defendants in Artist M. had not met the bur-
den imposed on them by § 1983 to demonstrate that Congress, in enact-
ing the AACWA, intended to preclude enforcement of the reasonable-
efforts clause through § 1983.51
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 and reversed.53 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 4 reiterated the rule that an ac-
tion under § 1983 is not available if the statute does not confer
enforceable rights or if Congress has precluded the applicability of
§ 1983 in the statute.5 The Chief Justice did not, however, recognize the
Court's recent articulation of the test for determining whether a federal
statutory provision has created enforceable rights under § 1983.56
In analyzing § 1983's enforceability, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman 17 for the principle that
when Congress wants to place conditions on federal grants, "it must do
49. The case referred to is Wilder, 496 U.S. 498. In Wilder, the Supreme Court addressed
the applicability of § 1983 to the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act. See supra note 8 for
a brief description of the Wilder test. See infra notes 104-28 for a thorough discussion of the
Wilder case.
50. Artist M., 917 F.2d at 986-87. The court of appeals also explained that because the
reasonable-efforts clause was tied explicitly to funding under the Act, the provision created an
obligation binding on the states; this provided further evidence that the reasonable-efforts
clause created an enforceable right in the plaintiffs. Id. at 987. This and the other two factors
of the enforceable right inquiry under § 1983 are discussed at length later in this Note. See
infra notes 96, 115, 161 and accompanying text (intent to benefit putative plaintiff), notes 116-
17, 163-71 and accompanying text (binding obligation versus mere congressional preference),
and notes 97-98, 118-20, 172-76 and accompanying text (not too vague or amorphous to
enforce).
51. Artist M., 917 F.2d at 987, 988-89. According to the preclusion exception, § 1983 is
not available to plaintiffs when Congress intended to foreclose enforcement of a federal statute
under § 1983. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1366. The preclusion exception to § 1983's applicability
is discussed in greater detail infra notes 79-95 and accompanying text.
52. 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
53. ArtistM., 112 S. Ct. at 1370.
54. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas joined the Chief Justice's opin-
ion. Id. at 1363.
55. Id. at 1366. The Court originally developed this rule in Middlesex County Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981). See infra notes 79-86 and
accompanying text for discussion of the Sea Clammers case.
56. ArtistM., 112 S. Ct. at 1366 (statement of the relevant § 1983 case law).
57. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). See infra note 78 for a discussion of the Pennhurst case.
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so unambiguously." 8 Relying on this language and explaining that the
plaintiff has the burden to prove congressional intent to create an en-
forceable right, 9 the majority concluded that the reasonable-efforts
clause of the AACWA conferred no enforceable right on beneficiaries of
the Act; the Act's language and legislative history did not reveal unam-
biguously Congress's intent to provide a private remedy for enforcing
that clause.' The Court further stated that rather than providing a spe-
cific statutory definition of what constitutes reasonable efforts, Congress
gave the states ample discretion under the AACWA to make this deter-
mination themselves.6 1 Finally, since the AACWA provides other en-
forcement mechanisms whenever a foster care agency has failed to make
reasonable efforts,62 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court's de-
58. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1366 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (citations omitted)).
Pennhurst was not a § 1983 case, so Chief Justice Rehnquist's reliance on its language, rather
than on Wilder's language about § 1983, is somewhat questionable.
59. Id. at 1370. The Court cited Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the case setting out the
test for determining whether a federal statute contains an implied remedy. Under Cort, a
private remedy may be implied from a federal statute when (1) the plaintiff is a member of the
class of persons the statute was intended to benefit, (2) there is either explicit or implicit legis-
lative intent to create a private remedy, (3) the court's implication of a private remedy is
consistent with "the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme," and (4) the private action
is not one "traditionally relegated to state law," in which case implying a federal remedy is
inappropriate. Id at 78.
Traditionally, the Court has considered the question of whether a private remedy may be
implied from a federal statute completely separate and distinct from the question of whether a
private remedy exists under § 1983 for violation of a federal statute. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508-09 n.9 (1990). But see infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text (not
viewing the two inquiries as distinct).
60. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1367-70. Specifically, the Court found that Congress, by not
enacting a statutory definition of "reasonable efforts," gave states the discretion to define the
term and comply with the requirement. Id. at 1368. The Court cited Senate and House com-
mittee reports reflecting Congress's confidence in the states' abilities to "discharge their duties"
under the AACWA and to determine what services are appropriate in a given situation. Id. at
1369-70 n.15. The Court also noted that Congress had enacted other enforcement mechanisms
for the reasonable-efforts clause, idL at 1368, and had imposed "precise requirements on the
States" in other parts of the AACWA. Id. at 1369 n.12. Since the reasonable-efforts clause
was not worded like these other precise requirements, the Court concluded that Congress had
not intended for it to create enforceable rights under § 1983. Id. Finally, in further support of
its holding, the Court cited a lack of specificity in the regulations relevant to the reasonable-
efforts provision. Id. at 1369 n.14.
61. Id. at 1369. Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the states had no notice that
they had to do anything more than submit a plan to the Secretary of Health and Human
Resources outlining how they would make the requisite reasonable efforts. Due to this lack of
legislative notice that the reasonable-efforts clause may impose substantive, binding obligations
on the states, only the existence of a plan-and not actual compliance with it-was required
for a state to receive funding under the AACWA. Id. On this basis, the Artist M. Court held
that the reasonable-efforts clause created no enforceable rights and, consequently, could not
support a private action under § 1983. Id. at 1370. For further discussion of the "plan is
enough" argument, see infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
62. These other "enforcement mechanisms" consist of (1) the power of the Secretary of
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nial of an enforceable private right under § 1983 hardly makes the Act a
"dead letter. 6 3
In a stinging and thorough dissent joined by Justice Stevens, Justice
Blackmun argued that the Artist M. majority had disregarded precedent
without cause or explanation." He asserted that the majority's decision
clearly conflicted with its previous case law because the reasonable-ef-
forts provision was "functionally identical" to a statute held enforceable
under § 1983 only two years before the Artist M. ruling.6" Justice Black-
mun outlined the prior § 1983 jurisprudence and argued that the major-
ity's analysis differed substantially from that employed in its most recent
§ 1983 case addressing a federal statute's enforceability.66 He concluded
that the reasonable-efforts provision created an enforceable right because
it met the elements of the traditional enforceable rights test.67 According
to the Court's established § 1983 analysis, Justice Blackmun insisted, de-
fendants who sought to defeat a § 1983 action bore the difficult burden of
demonstrating congressional intent to foreclose such a remedy for viola-
tions of a federal statute.68 The Artist M. majority, argued Justice Black-
mun, effectively shifted that burden onto plaintiffs, requiring them to
prove that Congress had conferred on them the right to enforce the stat-
ute under § 1983.69
Health and Human Services to reduce or deny federal funding when states are not complying
with the Act's requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 671(b) (1988), and (2) the requirement of a "judicial
determination" (typically by a juvenile court) that reasonable efforts were made to keep the
child in the home. Id. § 672(a)(1).
63. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1369.
64. Id. at 1371 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498
(1990)). Justice Blackmun was referring to the reasonable-rates provision of the Boren
Amendment to the Medicaid Act that the Court enforced under § 1983 in Wilder. Id. (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). The Boren Amendment required states to set reasonable rates of reim-
bursement to health care providers of Medicaid related services. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 501-02.
66. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1375-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1373-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1376 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Language in the Court's previous opinions
indicates that there is a presumption in favor of finding an implied cause of action in federal
statutes via § 1983. Wilder, 496 U.S. 498, 508-09 n.9 (explaining that there is a "general rule"
in favor of finding federal statutes enforceable under § 1983).
69. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1376 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Traditionally, plaintiffs were
not required to meet this heavy burden with regard to legislative intent because Congress, in
enacting § 1983, already had expressed its intent to provide remedies for federal statutory
violations made under color of state law. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. To Jus-
tice Blackmun's credit, there is ample evidence in the Artist M. opinion that Chief Justice
Rehnquist believed the burden of proof with regard to legislative intent in § 1983 actions is on
the plaintiffs. See Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1370 (The reasonable-efforts provision is not enforce-
able under § 1983 because its "language does not unambiguously confer an enforceable right
upon the Act's beneficiaries.") (emphasis added).
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According to § 1983, whenever a state actor deprives a person of
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,"
the wronged person may bring a private action, at law or in equity, in
federal court.7" In Maine v. Thiboutot,71 the Supreme Court interpreted
the "and laws" phrase in § 1983 to apply to federal statutes.72 Citing
previous cases indicating the Court's opinion that § 1983 applied to vio-
lations of federal statutes as well as violations of constitutional rights,73
the Court held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
197671 could be enforced through private suits brought under § 1983.11
The Court refused to restrict § 1983's applicability to civil rights statutes
or to cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; instead, the Court rested its broad holding on the "plain
language" of § 1983.76 Thiboutot thus opened the door to private actions
in favor of all plaintiffs who could demonstrate that a given statute had
created a right or privilege that they were being denied.77
After Thiboutot, the Supreme Court addressed § 1983's applicability
to several federal statutes.78 Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Na-
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
71. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
72. Id. at 4-5.
73. Id. at 4-6.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
75. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 3-4, 11. Thiboutot was a recipient of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). Id. at 3. He was notified that in computing his benefits for
three children from a previous marriage (all of whom he now supported), the Maine Depart-
ment of Human Services would no longer consider the money he spent to support his other five
children (from his current marriage). Id. Thiboutot challenged the state's interpretation of a
provision of the Social Security Act that supported this action by Maine's Department of
Human Services; after exhausting his remedies under state administrative law, he requested
state judicial review. Id. In an amended complaint, Thiboutot alleged a cause of action under
§ 1983 for himself and "others similarly situated." Id.
The Supreme Court of Maine upheld Thiboutot's claim and granted him and the other
complainants attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Id. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, Thiboutot, 444 U.S. 1042 (1980), and affirmed, Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4.
76. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 6-7. The defendants in Thiboutot argued that § 1983 should
only apply to civil rights laws and claims under the Equal Protection Clause because that was
Congress's intent in passing the original statute. Id. The Court acknowledged that one of the
principal purposes of adding the phrase "and laws" to § 1983's predecessor was to "ensure
that federal legislation providing specifically for equality of rights would be brought within the
ambit of the civil action authorized by that statute." Id. at 7 (quoting Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 637 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)). The Court concluded,
however, that this was not Congress's only purpose in amending the language of § 1983. Id.
77. See id. at 5.
78. Many of the statutes examined by the Court were enacted, like the AACWA, pursuant
to Congress's spending power. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1366; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1
("Congress shall have the Power To ... provide for the ... general Welfare of the United
States."). The Court's first application of the Thiboutot rule was the 1981 case of Pennhurst
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tional Sea Clammers Ass'n 79 was the Court's first clear articulation of the
Thiboutot rule. In Sea Clammers, the Court noted that it had "recog-
nized two exceptions to the application of [section] 1983 to statutory vio-
lations... (i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of
that statute in the enactment itself [the so-called preclusion exception],
and (ii) whether the statute at issue.., was the kind that created enforce-
able 'rights' under [section] 1983. " 80 Justice Powell, writing for the ma-
jority, explained that Congress need not expressly preclude a § 1983
action for the first exception to apply." Whenever the remedies provided
under a statute are comprehensive enough, they will "suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent" to preclude § 1983 private actions.82 The
Sea Clammers Court found that the Federal Water Pollution Control
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). See Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1366.
The Pennhurst Court held that § 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976) (presently codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-
6083 (1988)), which granted mentally retarded persons "a right to appropriate treatment, serv-
ices, and habilitation" in "the setting that is least restrictive of. . .personal liberty," Id
§ 6010(1)-(2), did not create an implied cause of action in favor of mentally retarded persons.
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18-23. Writing for the majority in Pennhurst, then-Justice Rehnquist
rejected the implied remedy claim because Congress intended § 6010 "to be hortatory, not
mandatory." Id. at 24.
Because the Court found no enforceable rights in favor of the Pennhurst claimants under
§ 6010, it did not actually "reach the question whether there is a private cause of action.., to
enforce those rights" under § 1983. Id. at 28 n.21. Pennhurst has often been quoted, nonethe-
less, for its passages relating to § 1983, and the Court has incorporated Pennhurst's commen-
tary on § 1983 into its case law. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981). The Pennhurst Court noted that § 1983 does not provide a
private remedy for violation of a federal statute when the statute does not create a "right
secured" by federal law, Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28, or when the statute" 'provides an exclusive
remedy for violations of its terms.'" Id. (quoting Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 22 n.11 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)). The latter exception to § 1983's applicability (the so-called "preclusion excep-
tion") would prove crucial to the Court's later analyses, including the reasoning of Artist M.
Ironically, this important requirement of § 1983 analysis began as a recognition, in dictum, of
a dissenting justice's opinion.
79. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
80. Id. at 19 (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28). The Court addressed the § 1983 issue-
even though neither of the parties to Sea Clammers had raised it-because the Sea Clammers
litigation started "long before" the Court's decision in Thiboutot. Id. Thiboutot was decided
in June, 1980, seven months before oral arguments in Sea Clammers, so the Court could have
required the parties to amend their complaints and answers to address the § 1983 question.
Consequently, one wonders if the Sea Clammers Court addressed § 1983 out of its concern for
the parties' claims or, rather, because of a desire to narrow and clarify Thiboutot.
81. Id. at 20-21.
82. Id. at 20. Justice Powell explained, "[W]hen 'a state official is alleged to have violated
a federal statute which provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements
of that enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983.'"
Id. (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 673 n.2 (1979) (Stewart,
J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
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Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA or Clean Water Act) 3 and the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA) s4
contain comprehensive remedial schemes; as a result, these statutes were
not enforceable under § 1983.85 "It is hard to believe," wrote Justice
Powell, "that Congress intended to preserve the [section] 1983 right of
action when it created so many specific statutory remedies, including the
two citizen-suit provisions." 86
The Supreme Court later affirmed the relevance of the preclusion
exception in a case in which allowing the § 1983 suit would have
"render[ed] superfluous" the statute's detailed procedural protections.87
In an oft-quoted passage from that case, however, the Court expressed its
hesitancy to apply the preclusion exception and reiterated the strong
showing defendants must make to support it:
83. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)).
84. Id §§ 1401-1445.
85. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 19-20.
86. Id at 20. Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's approach and conclusions in Sea
Clammers. He argued that when one acting under color of state law denies a plaintiff's statu-
tory rights, courts must presume that § 1983 "provides an express remedy" for the violation
"unless Congress has expressly withdrawn that remedy." Id. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). In Justice Stevens' opinion, the legislative history demonstrated no clear
congressional intent to preclude § 1983; in fact, he argued that the statutes demonstrated Con-
gress's desire to preserve outside remedies. Id at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To support this
assertion, Justice Stevens quoted specific provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(e) (1976) (" 'Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class
of persons) may have under any statute... to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or
limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State
agency)' "), and a provision of MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5) (1976) (" 'The injunctive relief
provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any person (or class of persons)
may have under any statute... to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek
any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State
agency)' "). Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12 (1984). In Smith, the plaintiffs based their
§ 1983 claim on alleged violations of Constitutional protections, and not on violations of the
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1461 (1982) (presently codified
at §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. II), because, as the Supreme Court noted, "Courts generally
agree that the EHA may not be claimed as the basis for a § 1983 action." Smith, 468 U.S. at
1008 n. 11 (citing, e.g., Department of Educ., Hawaii v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 820 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985); Quackenbush v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., 716
F.2d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1071 (1984); Anderson v. Thompson, 658
F.2d 1205, 1215 (7th Cir. 1981)). The Smith Court held that a handicapped child does not
have a right to bring a § 1983 action demanding a "free appropriate public education" under
the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause because Congress wanted the EHA to be the exclu-
sive remedy for this problem. Id. at 1009. The Court reached this conclusion because the
EHA was a "carefully tailored" and "comprehensive scheme," id., for remedying violations of
the child's right to a "free appropriate public education." Id. at 1009-13. The Smith Court
emphasized that Congress felt the needs of handicapped children were best accommodated by
allowing parents and local education agencies to work together to formulate an individualized
plan for each handicapped child's education. Id.
We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude
reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal protec-
tion claim. Since 1871, when it was passed by Congress, § 1983
has stood as an independent safeguard against deprivations of
federal constitutional and statutory rights. Nevertheless,
§ 1983 is a statutory remedy and Congress retains the authority
to repeal it or replace it with an alternative remedy. The crucial
consideration is what Congress intended.88
The Supreme Court clarified the defendant's burden to prove the
preclusion exception in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment &
Housing Authority.89 In that case, the Supreme Court explained that
under its prior case law,9" the preclusion exception prevents enforcement
under § 1983 when "the state actor demonstrates by express provision or
other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to
foreclose such private enforcement."9 1 Under Wright, the preclusion ex-
ception does not apply when a statute and its legislative history are "de-
void of any express indication that exclusive enforcement authority was
vested" in a particular enforcing body,92 particularly when there is some
indication that Congress anticipated private actions under the statute.93
The Court distinguished the statutory provision at issue in Wright, under
which the plaintiffs' only remedies were "local grievance procedures,"
from previous cases like Sea Clammers, where the relevant statute con-
tained a comprehensive enforcement scheme.94 The Court further illu-
88. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
89. 479 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1987). The complainants in Wright were tenants of low-income
housing projects owned by a public housing authority, which were established by the U.S.
Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1401-1436 (1970) (presently codified at §§ 1401-1440
(1988)). Wright, 479 U.S. at 419-20. The 1969 Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act, Pub.
L. No. 91-152, § 213, 83 Stat. 389 (1969), imposed a rent ceiling on public housing projects
and, as later amended in 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 322, 95 Stat. 400 (1981), provided that
low-income families should pay a percentage of their incomes as rent. Wright, 479 U.S. at 420.
Relying on the fact that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had
"consistently considered 'rent' to include a reasonable amount for the use of utilities," and that
HUD had expressed this view in its regulations, id. at 420-21 & n.3 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 865.470
(1983) (applicable regulation), 47 Fed. Reg. 35,249-35,250 (1982) (HUD's proposed rule stat-
ing its general practice), and 49 Fed. Reg. 31,399 (1984) (actual amendment of the regula-
tion)), the tenants brought suit under § 1983 and the Brooke Amendment, alleging that
respondent had overcharged them for utilities. Wright, 479 U.S. at 421-22. The Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the tenants. Id at 424.
90. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423 (citing Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012-13, Middlesex County Sewer-
age Auth. v. National Sea Clanmners Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981), and Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981)).
91. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423 (emphasis added).
92. Id at 424.
93. Id In Wright, Congress had indicated no intent to make HUD the exclusive enforcer
of the Brooke Amendment. Id at 424-25.
94. Id. at 427; see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing statutes litigated
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minated the preclusion exception issue by addressing the relevance of
private state judicial remedies, holding that the plaintiffs' right to sue in
state court was "hardly a reason" for barring a § 1983 action, which
involves a "federal remedy for the enforcement of federal rights.""5
Wright also clarified when a federal statute creates an enforceable
right by introducing a critical new consideration. The Court held that
when Congress intended that a statute benefit the class of plaintiffs bring-
ing the § 1983 suit-the putative plaintiffs-that factor weighs in favor of
finding an enforceable right.96 Finally, the Wright Court addressed the
common contention of § 1983 defendants that the statute at issue is "too
vague and amorphous" to confer an enforceable right and therefore is
"beyond the competence of the judiciary" to enforce.9 7 In Wright, the
Court rejected that argument because the regulations defining the rele-
vant provisions of the statute were sufficiently particular and specific to
counter any vagueness claim.9 8
In her dissent to the Wright decision, Justice O'Connor argued that
the Brooke Amendment created no enforceable right in the tenants under
§ 1983. 99 She insisted that courts should look carefully at legislative in-
tent to determine if an enforceable right was created under § 1983, just as
courts rely on legislative intent when determining if a statute itself con-
in Sea Clammers which contained citizen suit provisions); see also supra note 87 (discussing
statute litigated in Smith that was intended to be exclusive remedy).
95. Wright, 479 U.S. at 429.
96. Id. at 430-32. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103
(1989), echoed the principle that Congress's intent to benefit the "putative plaintiff" was an
important factor in determining if an enforceable right had been created. Id. at 106. In
Golden State, the Court held that even though the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
enjoys a comprehensive "exclusive jurisdiction" to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices
by employers and unions, § 1983 still creates an enforceable right under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) (presently codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
917 (1988)), for parties to a collective bargaining agreement to use "economic weapons" (i.e.,
strikes) without state or federal governmental interference. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 108-09,
111.
97. Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32.
98. Id. at 432. The Golden State Court agreed that a statute creates no enforceable right
under § 1983 when that right is so amorphous that it defies judicial enforcement. Golden
State, 493 U.S. at 106 (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32).
99. Wright, 479 U.S. at 432-41 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor found that
neither the "language," nor the "legislative history," nor the "administrative interpretation" of
the Amendment indicated Congress's intent to create an enforceable right to reasonable utili-
ties. Id. at 437 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She expressed her concern about over-applying
§ 1983:
[L]urking behind the Court's analysis may be the view that, once it has been found
that a statute creates some enforceable right, any regulation adopted within the pur-
view of the statute creates rights enforceable in federal courts, regardless of whether
Congress or the promulgating agency ever contemplated such a result.
Id. at 438 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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tains a implied remedy."° Justice O'Connor treated legislative intent as
an essential element of the complainant's case for a § 1983 suit, 1 ' and
was willing to rely on state courts to provide remedies for activities that,
in her opinion, did not rise to the level of federally enforceable rights." 2
Her approach foreshadowed the critical turning point in § 1983 analysis
that Artist M represents. 10 3
The Supreme Court's most recent and detailed statement on how
§ 1983 should be applied to federal statutes came in Wilder v. Virginia
Hospital Ass'n.1° Wilder involved several provisions of the amended
Medicaid Act,105 under which a state may obtain funding from the fed-
eral government to help cover its reimbursements to those health care
providers serving needy persons.106 To qualify for these federal monies, a
state must submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services10 7 a
comprehensive plan outlining the state's Medicaid program.10 8 The Bo-
ren Amendment to the Medicaid Act provided that the state's plan must
include an explanation of the state's reimbursement scheme for providers
100. Id. at 432-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The implied remedy test is the four-prong
inquiry from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). See supra note 59 (discussing of the four-
prong test). The second prong of the test is whether Congress demonstrated an intent to make
the particular statute privately enforceable. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. Interestingly, to support her
proposed § 1983 analysis in Wright, Justice O'Connor relied on quotations from cases that did
not address the question of whether a federal statute creates an enforceable right under § 1983.
She cited conclusions from the Sea Clammers decision, where the Court was looking at
whether legislative intent precluded the § 1983 remedy-not whether it created a right.
Wright, 479 U.S. at 433 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981), for the statement that" 'the key to the
inquiry is the intent of the Legislature' "). Justice O'Connor also cited a portion of the Pen-
nhurst opinion addressing whether the statute at issue contained an implied remedy-not
whether § 1983 applied. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hos-
pital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981), for the principle that the statute must be cast in
mandatory, not "precatory" terms).
101. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 433-40 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 440-49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In my view, petitioners do have a rem-
edy in seeking to secure utilities from respondent: they may sue on their leases.").
103. See infra notes 163-71, 177-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's vision of § 1983 as evidenced in Artist M. In Wright, this type of approach was
overruled by a narrow majority: Justice White authored the majority opinion, which was
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Wright, 479 U.S. at 419. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia joined Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Wright. Id. at 432 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
104. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1982) (presently codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1387f
(1988)).
106. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 502.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a).
108. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 502 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (1989)).
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and must establish "reasonable and adequate" rates of reimbursement.° 9
In Wilder, a nonprofit association of private and public hospitals
brought suit against the governor of Virginia under § 1983.110 The plain-
tiffs alleged that the state's Medicaid reimbursement plan violated the
Boren Amendment because its rates were not "reasonable and adequate"
to meet the Amendment's express goals."'1 The Supreme Court agreed.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan began by reciting the two previ-
ously recognized exceptions that would bar enforceability of a federal
statute under § 1983: the statute's failure to create an enforceable right
and the congressional preclusion exception. 112 Justice Brennan then con-
solidated the Court's prior § 1983 case law regarding enforceable rights
into a three-part test:1 13 if the putative plaintiff is an intended beneficiary
of the statute, then the statute creates enforceable rights so long as it
imposes a binding obligation (not a mere congressional preference) and it
is not too ambiguous or vague to be competently enforced by the
judiciary.1 14
Applying the first prong of this test, the Court decided the Boren
Amendment clearly was intended to benefit hospitals seeking reimburse-
ment at reasonable rates-the putative plaintiffs in Wilder."' Next, the
Court found that the Boren Amendment created a binding obligation
because federal funding under the Medicaid Act was tied explicitly to the
state's compliance with its provisions. 16 The Amendment represented
more than a mere congressional preference because, unlike the statute
and regulations in Pennhurst, the Amendment and its accompanying reg-
ulations explicitly conditioned federal funding on compliance with the
109. Id. at 501-02 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (Supp. 1982)). States must utilize
rates determined in accordance with the methods and standards developed by the State
which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reason-
able and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and eco-
nomically operated facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity with
State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards and to assure
that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable access... to inpatient
hospital services of adequate quality.
Id. at 503 (emphasis changed). The Medicaid Act does not define the terms "reasonable and
adequate" rates, "reasonable access," or "adequate quality," and the Secretary of Health and
Human Services has chosen not to adopt a nationally binding definition of the terms; the Secre-
tary believes the states should have the freedom to define those terms. Id. at 507.
110. Id. at 501-03.
111. Id at 503.
112. Id at 508; see supra notes 55, 80 and accompanying text.
113. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509.
114. Id
115. Id. at 510. "The provision establishes a system for reimbursement of providers and is
phrased in terms benefitting health care providers." Id.
116. Id. at 512.
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•"reasonable and adequate" rates requirement, thus demonstrating Con-
gress's intent that this statute be mandatory. 117 Finally, applying the
third prong of the enforceable rights test, the Court held that the reason-
able-rates requirement was not too vague and amorphous to be enforced
judicially because the statute provided an objective method for evaluating
reasonableness.' 18 Although Congress intended to give each state con-
siderable discretion in choosing a rate calculation method,119 the Wilder
Court insisted that "there certainly are some rates.., that no State could
ever find to be reasonable and adequate under the Act." 
1 20
One important issue in Wilder was precisely what right was enforce-
able under § 1983. The Court rejected the state's argument that its only
obligation under the Boren Amendment was a procedural one-simply
to "make findings" that its rates were reasonable and to assure the Secre-
tary of that fact.1 21 The Court refused to interpret the Boren Amend-
ment in a manner that would "render it a dead letter" 1 22 and cited
extensive legislative history to buttress its holding that the right enforcea-
ble under § 1983 was substantive, not merely procedural.1 23
The Court's analysis of the preclusion exception-which bars en-
forcement of a federal statute under § 1983-was somewhat more refined
than in past cases. Justice Brennan explained that to prove Congress
intended to foreclose § 1983 suits for statutory violations, the defendant
must point to either an express reference in the statute or "other specific
evidence from the statute itself."1 24 He noted that when there is no ex-
press foreclosure, the Court has found implied foreclosure only when the
statute's remedial scheme was so comprehensive it demonstrated Con-
117. Id. at 510-12.
118. Id. at 519.
119. Id. at 515, 519.
120. Id. at 520.
121. Id. at 514.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 515-19. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Wilder, and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy joined in his dissent. Id, at 524 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent
contended that the language of the Boren Amendment indicated no intent to create a substan-
tive right enforceable under § 1983. Id. at 527-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). According to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the statute conferred only a procedural right: that states be required
to set rates according to the mandatory process. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief
Justice also argued that the Boren Amendment and Medicaid Act did not expressly focus on
the plaintiffs (Medicaid services providers) as its beneficiaries. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing).
A critical aspect of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wilder is his argument that the
inquiry under § 1983 and under the implied statutory remedy theory are not distinguishable.
See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
124. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous.
Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
gress's preclusionary intent. 125 As Justice Brennan pointed out, the
Court had found such a scheme in only two cases, both of which in-
volved statutes with substantial administrative or judicial remedies;' 2 6 in
each of these cases there was also some provision for "private judicial or
administrative enforcement." 127 The Medicaid Act's remedial provi-
sions-which permit the Secretary of Health and Human Services to di-
minish a state's funding when its plan does not comply with the
Medicaid Act--did not, in the Court's opinion, constitute a scheme that
was "sufficiently comprehensive" to demonstrate congressional intent to
foreclose a § 1983 action. 12
As Wilder and Wright demonstrate, the Court has hardly reached a
consensus on the proper approach to examining federal statutory reme-
dies under § 1983. Both of these cases involved five-to-four decisions in
which a narrow majority articulated a multi-faceted test for § 1983 and
held that a statute requiring "reasonableness" created an enforceable
statutory right under § 1983.129 Furthermore, in both cases the dissent-
ers insisted that to gain a remedy for the violation of a federal statute
through § 1983 plaintiffs must demonstrate that the statute clearly was
intended by Congress to confer on individuals a privately enforceable
right. 1
30
Virtually all of the Justices have been highly consistent in their
stances on § 1983's application to federal statutes.' 3 ' As a result of the
125. Id at 521.
126. Id. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), and supra
note 87 for a discussion of Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
127. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521. The Sea Clammers statutes contained two citizen suit provi-
sions. Id. The Smith statute included "local administrative review" that "culminated in a
right to judicial review." Id.
128. Id. at 521-22. The defendants in Wilder contended that because Congress gave the
Secretary of Health and Human Resources the power to reduce or withhold a state's funding if
that state does not impose reasonable rates, Congress intended to foreclose the remedy for
unreasonable rates under § 1983. Id. at 514. With regard to the creation of enforceable rights,
Justice Brennan turned that argument on its head; the Court found that the Secretary's control
over funding "support[ed] the conclusion that the provision does create enforceable rights,"
since it put the States "on notice" that the reasonable rates requirement "is not a mere formal-
ity." Id. TheArtist M. Court contradicted this line of reasoning. See infra notes 180-85 and
accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 89-98, 104-112 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 99-103, 123 and accompanying text.
131. In cases where the Court held that a federal statute was enforceable under § 1983,
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, and White always joined the majority, while
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia (with one excep-
tion-Justice Scalia joined the majority in finding a National Labor Relations Act provision
enforceable under § 1983 in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103,
104 (1989)) always dissented. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 501, 524; Golden State Transit Corp. v.
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fairly settled positions of most of the Justices, personnel changes in the
Court had a critical impact on the resolution of Artist M. By the time the
Court decided Artist M., Justices Brennan and Marshall-two of the key
proponents of the traditional approach to § 1983-had been replaced by
Justices Souter and Thomas. Thus, with a split in the lower courts over
§ 1983's applicability to the reasonable-efforts requirement of the
AACWA,13 2 and with the heavy reliance by those courts on case law now
supported by only a minority of the Court,133 the stage was set for a
change in § 1983 analysis.
It is no wonder that before Artist M. the federal courts had inconsis-
tently13 1 interpreted § 1983's applicability to the reasonable-efforts clause
of the AACWA. The provision has been the subject of much confusion
City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 104, 113 (1989); Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment &
Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 419, 432 (1987); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1980).
Similarly, whenever the Court did not find a statute (or, in the case of Smith v. Robinson, 468
U.S. 992 (1984), a constitutional provision) enforceable under § 1983, the majority always
included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, while
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens almost always dissented. See Smith, 468
U.S. at 994, 1021; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 4-5, 22 (1981). There are a few exceptions. In Sea Clammers, Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined the majority in finding the two environmental statutes unenforceable under
§ 1983. Id. at 22. Also, Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in Smith holding the
Education of the Handicapped Act unenforceable under § 1983. Smith, 468 U.S. at 994.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988). Several courts have addressed the enforceability of
§ 671(a) of the AACWA under § 1983. See L.J. ex rel. Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123
(4th Cir. 1988) (substantive requirements listed in § 671(a) enforceable under § 1983, includ-
ing case plan requirement), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989), abrogated in part by Suter v.
Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992); Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (reasonable-efforts clause enforceable under § 1983), abrogated by Suter v. Artist M.,
112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992). But see B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1401 (N.D. Il1. 1989)
(reasonable-efforts clause not enforceable under § 1983). Other courts have addressed the en-
forceability of the AACWA in general (or the Social Security Act, of which the AACWA is a
subsection). See Del A. v. Edwards, 855 F.2d 1148, 1149, 1152 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that
children have enforceable right to development of case plan, review of plan, timely hearing,
and development of information systems under the Act and § 1983); Harpole v. Arkansas
Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Social Security Act
creates no enforceable rights for abused children's grandparents); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818
F.2d 791, 800 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding no merit in Social Security Act claims), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 512 (lst Cir. 1983) (holding the case
plan requirement enforceable under § 1983), abrogated in part by Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct.
1360 (1992); La Shawn v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 989 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that the
AACWA creates enforceable rights), abrogated in part by Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360
(1992); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (finding the rights
granted by Act too amorphous to be enforceable under § 1983).
133. The lower courts often relied on Wilder's enforceable right test. See, e.g., Winston v.
Children & Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1387-88 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding reasonable-efforts
clause enforceable under § 1983 by following Wilder and the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in
Artist M.), abrogated by Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2303
(1992).
134. See supra notes 132-33.
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for several reasons. First, there is no federal statutory135 or regulatory 136
definition of "reasonable efforts." As one author has noted, "it is up to
the states and their court systems to define" reasonable efforts.' 37 The
few states that have enacted a statutory definition of "reasonable efforts,"
however, have not shed much light on the meaning of the phrase; gener-
ally, they refer vaguely to an agency's obligation to use "reasonable dili-
gence and care"' 138 or "due diligence" 1 39 and to utilize "appropriate and
available services"'" to meet the needs of children and their families.
Another source of confusion about the reasonable-efforts require-
ment is that the statute and its accompanying federal regulations do not
mandate if or when the courts should determine whether an agency has
made the requisite reasonable efforts; again, this determination is left to
135. Shotton, supra note 11, at 225.
136. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the federal agency responsi-
ble for implementing the Act. Id. HHS has not defined "reasonable efforts," but has promul-
gated a regulation outlining services states should consider providing as part of their state
plans: (1) twenty-four hour emergency caretakers and household services; (2) day care; (3)
crisis counseling; (4) family and individual counseling; (5) emergency shelters; (6) emergency
monetary assistance; (7) temporary child care; (8) home-based family services; (9) self-help
groups; (10) single parent services; (11) drug and alcohol abuse counseling, mental health,
vocational counseling and rehabilitation; and (12) post-adoption services. 45 C.F.R.
§ 1357.15(e)(2) (1991).
137. Shotton, supra note 11, at 225.
138. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.41(4)(b) (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.183(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1992); see TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-166(g) (Supp. 1992) ("reasonable care and dili-
gence"). A few states have attempted to clarify the definition of reasonable efforts by listing
factors the courts should consider when making the reasonable-efforts determination. See id.
§ 37-1-166(c); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.355(2c)(a) (West Supp. 1992). Wisconsin requires the
court making the reasonable-efforts determination to consider whether the agency made a
"comprehensive assessment of the family's situation," provided financial assistance, or offered
in-home support services (i.e., homemakers), in-home intensive treatment services, and com-
munity services (i.e., day care, training on parenting skills, employment training). Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.355(2c)(a)(1)-(3)(c) (West Supp. 1992). Wisconsin courts must also consider
whether the agency monitored client progress or offered alternative services when appropriate.
Id. § 48.355(4)-(5).
Tennessee fieshes out its definition of reasonable efforts by requiring agencies to respond
to four questions; these questions are intended to help the court determine if reasonable efforts
have been made to avoid child removal and to reunite families. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-
166(c) (Supp. 1992). The foster care agency must first explain to the court whether removal is
necessary to protect the child's safety. If it is, the agency must specify the risks to the child.
Id. § 37-1-166(c)(1). Second, the agency must tell the court what services are needed to allow
the child to remain at home. Id. § 37-1-166(c)(2). The agency must also tell the court what
services it has provided to the family to prevent removal and to reunify the family if it was
separated. Id. § 37-1-166(c)(3). Finally, the agency must explain whether it has had the op-
portunity to provide its services to the family. If not, the agency must specify why it has not
had this chance. Id. § 37-1-166(c)(4).
139. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.012(b) (West 1992).
140. Id. Similarly, Missouri refers to an agency's duty to utilize "all available services" to
assist families. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.183(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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the states. 141 While many states have passed statutes addressing when a
court should decide if reasonable efforts have been or are being made,142
only a few have applied the reasonable-efforts requirement to several crit-
ical stages of their juvenile hearings. 43 Because of the lack of authority
on the matter, many states have inaccurately interpreted the conse-
quences of an agency's failure to make reasonable efforts to preserve or
reunite a child's family."4 Although the only result Congress intended
from this failure is that the state or agency be denied federal matching
funds for that case, 145 some states mistakenly have passed statutes that
require a showing of reasonable efforts before a child can be removed
from an unsafe home.1
46
While what efforts qualify as reasonable is unclear, the requirement
does impose some substantive obligations on states requesting funding
under the Act; state courts have addressed what those obligations are in
various contexts.147 Most of the cases interpreting the reasonable-efforts
141. Shotton, supra note 11, at 226.
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.402(2), (9), (10), 39.41(4)(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-6(e) (Bums 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.52(6), 232.95(2)(a),
232.102(5)(b) (West Supp. 1992); MiNN STAT. ANN. § 260.012(b) (West 1992); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 43-21-301(4)(c), -309(4)(c), -405(6), -603(7) (Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-
577(h), -651(c)(2) (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.577(3)(b)(B) (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-
1-166(a), (b), (c), (g) (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-251(A)(2), -252(A), (E)(2), -
282(D) (Michie Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.21(5)(b) (West 1987), § 48.355(2)(b)(6)
(West Supp. 1992).
143. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 306(b) (social worker taking temporary custody),
319(d) (hearing on continued agency custody), 361(c) (court limitations on removal and paren-
tal control), 366.21(e) (six-month status hearing), 366.21(f) (12-month status hearing),
366.22(a) (18-month status hearing) (West Supp. 1992); CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (declar-
ing parents free from custody) (West Supp. 1992). The California provisions usually refer to
ensuring that an agency has provided "reasonable services" to families. Id; see also, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-11-41(b) (West Supp. 1992) (reasonable-efforts determination required for
first order removing child from home and for "every subsequent review").
144. Shotton, supra note 11, at 227.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 671(b) (1988). When the Secretary finds that a state plan
no longer complies with the provisions of subsection (a) of this section [which in-
cludes the reasonable-efforts requirement, part (a)(15)], or that in the administration
of the plan there is a substantial failure to comply with the provisions of the plan, the
Secretary shall notify the State that further payments will not be made to the State
[under the Act or that payments will be] reduced by an amount which the Secretary
determines appropriate until the Secretary [is convinced that the state is complying
with the section].
Id. There is no reference in § 671 to an agency's need to meet the section's requirements in
order to remove children from dangerous homes.
146. Shotton, supra note 11, at 227.
147. A few state courts have addressed the reasonable-efforts requirement in a context
prior to a parental-rights termination action. See In re A.L.W., 773 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (finding no reasonable efforts in taking four children from mother's custody simply
because agency worker responded to child abuse hotline "emergency" call); In re S.A.D., 382
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clause have been decided in state courts, usually in the context of specific
hearings brought by state agencies to determine whether a child should
be removed from the home or whether a parent's rights should be termi-
nated. 148 By comparison, reasonable-efforts suits in federal court are far
less common and involve different issues. Children or parents in federal
court have attempted to sue a state foster care agency for failing to make
reasonable efforts to avoid removing children from homes and to reunite
them with their families.14 9 In these suits, plaintiffs had to prove that
they were entitled to enforce the reasonable-efforts requirement in a pri-
vate action, based on one of two theories: either the Act itself provided
an implied cause of action, or § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act created a
private right of action under the AACWA. 150 In Suter v. Artist M., the
Supreme Court rejected both of these theories."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Artist M. represents a critical
departure from the Court's traditional § 1983 analysis in a number of
important ways. Chief Justice Rehnquist briefly mentioned the skeleton
test for applying § 1983, noting that it may not be used to enforce a fed-
eral statute when the statute does not create an enforceable right or when
Congress has foreclosed § 1983 action within the statute.1 s2 This basic
statement of the two exceptions to applying § 1983 was neither novel nor
unusual.1 - 3 What was highly unusual was the Chief Justice's failure to
Pa. Super. 166, 176, 555 A.2d 123, 128 (1989) (finding no reasonable efforts when agency took
child from responsible mother and refused to return child, instead of providing mother needed
money and housing).
148. Most state court decisions interpreting the reasonable-efforts requirement have been
parental right termination cases. See, e.g., In re Victoria M., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1317, 1330, 255
Cal. Rptr. 498, 505 (1989) (holding agency did not make reasonable efforts to provide appro-
priate services to mentally disabled parent); In re Derek W. Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 648-49 (Del.
1986) (holding agency did not make reasonable efforts with regard to housing); In re AMK,
723 S.W.2d 50-53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding agency made reasonable efforts to encourage
family to accept its services); In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 588-91 (R.I. 1987) (holding
agency did not make reasonable efforts to protect visitation rights). For a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the above cases and others in which states have interpreted the substantive requirements
of the reasonable-efforts provision, see Shotton, supra note 11, at 237-253.
149. See supra notes 132-33 for a list of some of the federal cases brought under the
AACWA.
150. See, e.g., Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1363. Courts traditionally have treated the § 1983
claim-that a statute is enforceable under § 1983-and the implied remedy claim-that a stat-
ute itself creates an implied remedy-as separate issues with distinct elements and burdens of
proof. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508-09 n.9 (1990) (noting that the
§ 1983 claim involves "a different inquiry than that involved in determining whether a private
right of action can be implied from a particular statute"). For further discussion of this tradi-
tional distinction and how the Artist M. Court treated it, see infra notes 186-93 and accompa-
nying text.
151. ArtistM., 112 S. Ct. at 1370.
152. Id. at 1366.
153. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508; Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493
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take the next step of the inquiry: outlining the three factors which Wil-
der cited as relevant to determining if an enforceable right has been cre-
ated by the statute. 15 4
Under the Wilder test, if the plaintiffs demonstrate that the federal
statute was intended to benefit them, the statute creates a right enforcea-
ble under § 1983 as long as it is not too vague to be enforced competently
and it does not reflect a mere "congressional preference" for a given type
of conduct, but rather an obligation binding a governmental body.155
Yet the Artist M. decision makes no reference to the relevance of this first
factor in determining whether the statute created an enforceable right
U.S. 103, 106 (1989); Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423
(1987).
154. See, e.g., Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509; Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106. Given the Court's
departure from Wilder's three-part test for determining whether a statute creates enforceable
rights, and because the statutes involved in Wilder and Artist M. are notably similar, it is
interesting to note how the Court carefully distinguishes Artist M.'s facts from those in Wilder.
The Wilder Court held that Medicaid providers have an enforceable right to "reasonable and
adequate" reimbursement rates under the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, Wilder,
496 U.S. at 509-10, while the provision at issue in Artist M. involved the private plaintiff's
right to reasonable efforts by foster care agencies to preserve and reunite families. Further-
more, both statutes require states to submit a "plan" in order to receive reimbursement from
the federal government. 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a), 1396a(a) (1988). Chief Justice Rehnquist distin-
guished the two statutes by pointing out that the Medicaid statute and accompanying regula-
tions at issue in Wilder detail the factors one should consider in determining the methods for
calculating reasonable rates. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1368. He stated that, by contrast, there is
no federal statutory guidance on how to define reasonable efforts; the AACWA, Chief Justice
Rehnquist continued, left the states a great deal of discretion to define the term. Id. at 1368-69
& n.15. The Court was not persuaded by the fact that the Department of Health and Human
Services had suggested services that foster care agencies can offer to the public, even though by
implication, the implementation of any of these suggestions might constitute evidence of rea-
sonable efforts. 45 C.F.R. § 1357.15(e)(2) (1991). See supra note 136 for a list of these sug-
gested services.
The Medicaid Act required a state to consider three factors when determining its method
for calculating reasonable rates: statutory requirements for adequate nursing home care, the
unique nature of a facility serving a large number of low-income patients, and special situa-
tions in which a hospital provides in-patient care when long-term nursing home care would be
adequate but is not available. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519 n.17. The majority in Artist M appar-
ently believed that the specificity of these Medicaid regulations-which outline the factors one
must always consider when calculating reasonableness-are not comparable (in terms of dem-
onstrating Congress's intent to create an enforceable right) to a list of suggested foster care
services. See Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1368. In contrast, Justice Blackmun believed the reason-
able-efforts provision was specific enough to be enforceable by the courts. Id. at 1374 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). He analogized to Wilder, pointing to the Court's comment there that
"'[w]hile there may be a range of reasonable rates, there certainly are some rates outside that
range that no State could ever find to be reasonable and adequate under the Act.'" Id. at 1374
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520).
155. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509. The Wilder Court did not expressly state that there is a
presumption in favor of enforceability under § 1983 when there is demonstrated legislative
intent to benefit the putative plaintiff, but the language of the opinion implies such a presump-
tion. See id. at 508-09 n.9.
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under traditional § 1983 analysis. Furthermore, the opinion contains
only indirect references to the other two factors traditionally considered
in similar § 1983 actions.156 The Chief Justice's entire analysis in Artist
M. rested on his conclusion that Congress did not intend to require states
receiving AACWA funding to make reasonable efforts to avoid removing
children from their homes and to reunite families, yet he made no ex-
plicit reference to the "binding obligations versus congressional prefer-
ence" exception described so explicitly in Wilder."7
While Chief Justice Rehnquist did not state Wilder's three-part test
for determining if an enforceable right had been created under § 1983,158
he may have applied the three prongs indirectly."19 Perhaps, since the
Court made reference to the plaintiffs as "beneficiaries" of the
AACWA, 1" it simply assumed, without articulation, that the plaintiffs in
Artist M. were intended beneficiaries of the Act and moved on to examin-
ing whether the relevant exceptions-mere congressional preference or
vagueness-applied."' Furthermore, in its extensive examination of the
legislative intent of the reasonable-efforts clause, the Court may have ad-
dressed indirectly the second and third prongs of the Wilder test.162
The Court appeared to address the "binding obligation" prong by
juxtaposing the language of the reasonable-efforts clause with its legisla-
tive intent.1 63 Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the AACWA
156. These other two factors are the creation of a binding obligation (rather than a mere
congressional preference) and the fact that the statute not be too vague for the courts to en-
force. Id. at 509.
157. ArtistM., 112 S. Ct. at 1366-67; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509, 510-12. Rather than relying
on the traditional test for determining enforceable rights under § 1983, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist applied a more fact-based analysis. He outlined the Court's holdings in three decisions
that were, presumably, the most relevant to the resolution of Artist M.: Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (discussed supra note 78); Wright v. Roa-
noke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (discussed supra notes 89-103
and accompanying text); and Wilder (discussed supra notes 104-28 and accompanying text).
Wright involved the reasonableness of utility rates for public housing tenants, Wright, 479 U.S.
at 420, and Wilder involved the reasonableness of reimbursement rates for Medicaid providers,
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 503. The Chief Justice noted that Wright and Wilder, like Artist M.,
involved statutory provisions in which the word "reasonable" was critical to the resolution of
the case. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1367. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, the
similarity between these three cases was not dispositive of the issues in Artist M. because in
Wright and in Wilder the Court "took pains to analyze the statutory provisions in detail, in
light of the entire legislative enactment," to determine if the statute had created rights enforce-
able under § 1983. Id.
158. See supra notes 56, 154-57, and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 160-77 and accompanying text.
160. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1367, 1370.
161. See id. at 1367-70.
162. See infra notes 163-76 and accompanying text.
163. ArtistM., 112 S. Ct. at 1367-70.
"is mandatory in its terms"; 164 nevertheless, he continued, courts must
not hold every phrase of a statute to be enforceable, but must determine
precisely what is required under the statute.165 The Chief Justice quoted
a passage from Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman 166 to
support this view that § 1983 only applies to a federal statute when Con-
gress unequivocally intended it to do so:
"The legitimacy of Congress's power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and
knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' There can, of
course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the
conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Ac-
cordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously."167
This passage reflects a recurring theme throughout Artist M.'s majority
opinion: To prove that the statute creates an enforceable right in their
favor, complainants under § 1983 must demonstrate clear legislative in-
tent to create such a right. 168 Using this approach, the Court analyzed
the regulations enforcing the AACWA's reasonable-efforts requirement
and concluded that they provide no evidence that Congress intended to
require states to do anything more than submit a plan to the Secretary in
order to receive AACWA funding.169 Accordingly, the Court held that
the AACWA only requires states which receive funding to have a plan
asserting that they will make the requisite reasonable efforts to preserve
and reunite families.17 Analyzing the Court's opinion under the rubric
of Wilder's test for enforceable rights, one could interpret this holding as
164. Id. at 1367.
165. Id.
166. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
167. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1366 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added)).
168. Id. at 1366-67.
169. Id. at 1369. The regulations referred to are 45 C.F.R. 1356.21, 45 C.F.R. 1357.15
(1991).
170. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1370. The Court reached this conclusion even though the
AACWA requires state plans to be "in effect in all political subdivisions of the State and, if
administered by them, be mandatory upon them." Id. at 1368 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(3)
(1988)). The Court did not think the words "in effect" modified the word "plan," but thought
that they simply meant that the plan must apply to all state entities administering the plan. Id.
Wilder and Artist M. both addressed the "plan is enough" issue-whether plaintiffs
should have substantive rights instead of just procedural ones. Id. at 1370-71 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The Artist M. Court held that the only enforceable right the AACWA creates in
plaintiffs is the right that a state "have a plan" asserting that it is making reasonable efforts to
keep children in the home and reunite families. Id. at 1367. The Wilder Court, in contrast,
rejected this line of argument from Justice Rehnquist's dissent:
The dissent... apparently would hold that the only right enforceable under § 1983 is
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a finding by the Court that there is a binding obligation on the states
under the reasonable-efforts requirement, but that obligation is simply to
have a plan containing the requisite elements. 171
Through his analysis of the legislative intent of the reasonable efforts
clause in Artist M., Chief Justice Rehnquist also may have addressed the
third prong of Wilder's enforceable rights test: the requirement that the
statute not be so vague and amorphous that the judiciary cannot compe-
tently enforce it.' 72 The Chief Justice explained that the reasonable-ef-
forts clause is not like the statute at issue in Wilder, where the statute
and accompanying regulations detailed the factors relevant to determin-
ing whether rates were reasonable. 173 By contrast, he continued, the
AACWA's reasonable-efforts requirement lacks a statutory or regulatory
definition; Congress intended that individual states have the chance to
define and evaluate an agency's reasonable efforts.174 Furthermore, the
Chief Justice referred more than once in Artist M. to the plaintiff's bur-
den of showing that the reasonable-efforts clause confers on its benefi-
ciaries an "unambiguous" right to sue under § 1983. 17  Thus, the
hypothesis that the Artist M. Court may have applied the third prong of
Wilder's enforceable rights test passively is supported by the Court's
analysis of the AACWA's defining regulations, the autonomy given to
the states to define "reasonable efforts," and the showing that the Artist
M. plaintiffs had to make to succeed under § 1983.176
In short, Chief Justice Rehnquist's explanation of the legislative in-
the right to compel compliance with these bare procedural requirements [of submit-
ting a plan]....
We reject that argument because it would render the statutory requirements...
and thus the entire reimbursement provision, essentially meaningless .... We decline
to adopt an interpretation of the Boren Amendment that would render it a dead
letter.
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 513-14. In his dissent to Artist M., Justice Blackmun contended that the
majority's resolution of the "plan is enough" issue is more consistent with Wilder's dissent
than with its holding. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1375 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Nevertheless,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's view on the issue has prevailed. Id. at 1367.
171. SeeArtist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1370.
172. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509. In analyzing the reasonable-efforts clause under § 1983,
Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on statements in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halder-
man, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), regarding ambiguity with regard to implied causes of action, which
arguably involve standards different from § 1983 cases. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1366-67. Nota-
bly, the Artist M. Court made no reference to the standard used in Wilder to judge ambiguity;
according to Wilder, a statutory right is unenforceable on the grounds of ambiguity only if it is
"too vague and amorphous" to be competently enforced by the judiciary. Wilder, 496 U.S. at
509 (emphasis added).
173. ArtistM., 112 S. Ct. at 1368.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1367, 1370.
176. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
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tent of the reasonable-efforts clause simply may have served as a vehicle
for the application of Wilder's test without explicit reference to its three
prongs.1 77 Careful examination of legislative intent in § 1983 cases in-
volving federal statutes is not inconsistent with the Court's prior case
law; as Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Artist M., the Wilder
Court took great care to examine the relevant statute and its legislative
history.1 78 On the other hand, as Justice Blackmun noted, there is little
precedential support for the manner in which the majority used legisla-
tive history in Artist M.7 9
The first unorthodox way in which the Artist M. majority analyzed
legislative intent was to use Congress's enactment of alternative enforce-
ment mechanisms as a factor relevant to determining whether enforcea-
ble rights had been created.180  Congress included in the AACWA
enforcement provisions that are triggered when a state agency fails to
make the requisite reasonable efforts.18 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist admit-
ted that these enforcement remedies may not rise to the level of a "com-
prehensive enforcement mechanism" evidencing legislative intent to
preclude a remedy under § 1983.182 Still, the Chief Justice asserted, the
existence of these remedies demonstrates that disallowing a private rem-
edy under § 1983 will not make the reasonable-efforts clause "a dead
letter."' 83 Justice Blackmun, in dissent, was very disturbed by the Artist
M. majority's finding that the existence of an alternative enforcement
177. See supra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
178. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1367. The Wilder Court thought legislative history was rele-
vant to the enforceable right inquiry. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 505 ("In order to determine whether
the Boren Amendment is enforceable under § 1983, it is useful first to consider the history of
the reimbursement provision."). But the Chief Justice may have mischaracterized Wright v.
Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987), by stating that the
Wright Court analyzed legislative intent when applying the enforceable rights rule. The bulk
of the Wright Court's legislative history analysis fell within its discussion of the preclusion
exception, an issue that relies completely on an interpretation of congressional intent. Id. at
424-29. The Wright Court's enforceable right discussion, in contrast, simply applied the tradi-
tional elements of enforceable rights analysis (i.e., intent to benefit and no vagueness) without
analyzing legislative history closely. Id. at 429-32.
179. See Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1377 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
181. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1368. The Secretary can reduce or cut off funding to a state if
it is not complying with its own plan. 42 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1988); Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1368.
In addition, to receive reimbursements for services given to a child removed from the home, a
state agency must demonstrate a judicial finding that the agency made the required reasonable
efforts. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1); Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1368.
182. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1368. The Court recognized the existence of the preclusion
exception, but held that it did not need to address that issue in Artist M. because it had not
even found that the reasonable-efforts clause created an enforceable right, the violation of
which could be redressed by a § 1983 action. Id. at 1368 n. 11.
183. Id. at 1369.
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mechanism-the Secretary's power to reduce or withdraw funding in re-
sponse to a state's failure to make reasonable efforts-weighed in favor of
finding that no enforceable rights existed.1" 4 In effect, the Artist M. ma-
jority applied to the enforceable rights inquiry a factor that traditionally
was considered relevant only to the validity of the preclusion exception
to applying § 1983.185
There is another critical distinction between the Artist M. Court's
approach to the relevance of legislative intent to a § 1983 action and the
Court's approach in previous cases; the Artist M. Court did not view as
distinct, discreet analyses the inquiry into § 1983's applicability to a stat-
ute and the inquiry into whether an implied cause of action exists directly
under a statute.186 The Artist M. Court found that the implied remedy
claim under the reasonable-efforts clause could "be disposed of quickly"
once the Court had concluded that the provision did not create an en-
forceable right under § 1983.187 The Chief Justice explained: "The most
important inquiry here as well [as in implied remedy cases] is whether
Congress intended to create the private remedy sought by the plain-
tiffs.' 1 88 Like Justice O'Connor in Wright,8 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist
confounded the test for ascertaining an enforceable right under § 1983
with that employed to discern whether a right of action may be implied
from a federal statute. 190
184. Id. at 1376 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun noted, the Court rejected
this line of argument explicitly in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), and
other cases. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1376 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Wilder, 496 U.S. at
514.
185. See Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1368-69. The preclusion exception holds that a federal
statute is not enforceable under § 1983 if Congress specifically foreclosed a § 1983 suit in the
statute.
186. Id. at 1370.
187. Id.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Justice O'Connor wrote in that case:
Whether a federal statute confers substantive rights is not an issue unique to § 1983
actions. In implied right of action cases, the Court also has asked... whether "the
statute create[s] a federal right in favor of the plaintiff." In determining whether a
statute creates enforceable rights, the "key to the inquiry is the intent of the
Legislature."
Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. at 432-33 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
190. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1370. In fact, the Court not only may see the implied remedy
inquiry and the § 1983 inquiry as similar; the Court may be starting to incorporate the factors
of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), into its § 1983 analysis. The Cort factors have been
criticized by individual Justices, however. Justice Scalia, for example, has noted the Court's
reluctance to imply remedies from federal statutes and has pointed out what he reads as the
Court's alterations to the Cort test:
It could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in
SECTION 1983
The Wilder Court expressly distinguished these two inquiries. Jus-
tice Brennan asserted in that case that the test for § 1983's applicability is
"a different inquiry" than the one used to determine if a private right of
action may be implied from the federal statute in question:
In implied right of action cases, we employ the four-factored
Cort test to determine "whether Congress intended to create
the private remedy asserted" for the violation of statutory
rights. The test reflects a concern, grounded in separation of
powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the avail-
ability of remedies for violations of statutes. Because § 1983
provides an "alternative source of express congressional author-
ization of private suits," these separation of powers concerns
are not present in a § 1983 case. Consistent with this view, we
recognize an exception to the general rule that § 1983 provides
a remedy for violation of federal statutory rights only when
Congress has affirmatively withdrawn the remedy. 191
Under the Wilder decision, then, private plaintiffs only needed to show,
at most, that Congress had not "affirmatively withdrawn" their right to
sue for violations of that statute under § 1983.192 In contrast, Artist M.
seems to require that private plaintiffs prove in § 1983 actions what they
must prove in implied remedy actions: clear legislative intent to confer
the private remedy. 193
Some may regard Suter v. Artist M. as a welcome limitation on the
over-application of § 1983 to federal statutes. Others may hail the case
as a shining example of judicial adherence to legislative intent. Indeed,
the Court may have been motivated by several unarticulated but legiti-
mate policy concerns when deciding Artist M. For instance, the Court
may have been motivated by its distaste for Congress's attempts to coerce
certain state action through the use of the Spending Clause of the Consti-
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979) and Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979), converting one of its four
factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other three
merely indicative of its presence or absence.
... [T]his Court has... abandoned its hospitable attitude towards implied
rights of action .... The recent history of our holdings is one of repeated rejection of
claims of an implied right.
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189-90 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia would prefer for the Court to take a "categorical position that federal private
rights of action will not be implied." Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Clearly, if the Court is beginning to incorporate the Cort v. Ash factors into its § 1983 analysis,
that trend does not bode well for plaintiffs attempting to sue under § 1983.
191. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508-09 n.9 (1990) (citations omitted).
192. See id
193. See ArtistM., 112 S. Ct. at 1370.
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tution.19 4 Even if one approves of the result reached by the Court, how-
ever, its reasoning and analysis are not without fault.
First, in determining whether an enforceable right was created, the
Artist M. Court ignored its own precedent without explaining or justify-
ing this departure.195 Wilder and previous cases carefully had fleshed out
the factors relevant to deciding if an enforceable right had been created-
namely, the intent to benefit the putative plaintiff,'96 the creation of a
binding obligation rather than congressional preference, 9 7 and the re-
quirement that the right created not be too vague or amorphous to be
judicially enforced.' 98 The Artist M. Court's failure to even state these
factors, much less apply them explicitly, is highly inconsistent with pre-
cedent in this area.' 99 Moreover, even if one accepts the argument that
the Court functionally applied the three prongs of the Wilder test,2"° the
Court collapsed the Wilder test into a vague inquiry into legislative intent
without explaining how to apply this new approach.2"'
The second difficulty with the Artist M. Court's analysis is its unusu-
ally heavy emphasis on the requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that
Congress intended to permit enforcement of a federal statute under
§ 1983.202 Before Artist M., the Court had used legislative history to but-
194. The Spending Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the power to "provide for the
... general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1. Congress may, inci-
dent to this Constitutional provision, "'further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt
of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative
directives.'" South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). The spending power is limited, however; specifically, if Congress
intends to condition federal funding to states, it "'must do so unambiguously. .. , enabl[ing]
the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participa-
tion.'" Id. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)). The Court has recognized that in some situations, Congress's financial inducement
"might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'" Dole,
483 U.S. at 210 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
195. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 96, 113-15, and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 97-98, 118-20, and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 96-97, 113-20, and accompanying text.
200. This Note proposes a means by which one can read the Artist M. opinion to have
addressed all three prongs implicitly. See supra notes 159-77 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 159-93 and accompanying text. The Court appeared to take a result-
oriented approach, emphasizing the views of the dissenting opinions in Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987), and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital
Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990): respect for state autonomy and a desire to restrict § 1983's scope.
See Wright, 479 U.S. at 440-41 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wilder, 496 U.S. at 528 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting); see also supra notes 99-103 (commenting on Wright dissent).
202. See supra notes 167-68, 186-93 and accompanying text.
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tress its application of the traditional test factors2 0 3 or to validate the
defendant's assertion that Congress precluded enforcement of the statute
under § 1983.21 Now, after Artist M., plaintiffs bringing suit under
§ 1983 shoulder virtually the same burden of demonstrating favorable
legislative intent as private plaintiffs who attempt to persuade the Court
to find an implied cause of action. In reaching this result, the Artist M,
Court blurs the distinction between two causes of action that until Artist
M. had remained appropriately distinct and separate.20 5 Furthermore,
according to the Court's decision in Maine v. Thiboutot,20 6 Congress in-
tended for § 1983 to create a private remedy for the enforcement of fed-
eral statutory rights.20 7 Consequently, Artist M.'s apparent equation of
the plaintiff's burden of proof in § 1983 actions with the plaintiff's bur-
den in implied remedy cases20 thwarts Congress's original intent in pass-
ing § 1983209 and renders it useless with regard to federal statutory
violations made under color of state law.210
The basic flaw of the Artist M. decision, then, is that it unnecessarily
muddles § 1983 jurisprudence in the area of enforceable rights.211 The
Court's refusal to state pointedly and apply its traditional factors for de-
termining whether enforceable rights have been created by a federal stat-
ute accomplishes precisely what the Court (and all courts) normally
203. The Artist M. Court said Wilder and Wright examined legislative intent carefully, but
failed to clarify that they did so in the context of addressing the three traditional factors rele-
vant to the creation of an enforceable right. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510 (putative plaintiff),
512 (binding obligation), 519 (vagueness); Wright, 479 U.S. at 420-30 (putative plaintiff and
binding obligation); 431 (vagueness).
204. See supra notes 91-95, 125-28, and accompanying text; see also supra note 87 (discuss-
ing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12 (1984), where the Supreme Court held that the
"carefully tailored and comprehensive scheme" under the Education of the Handicapped Act
precluded a § 1983 action).
205. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
206. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
207. Id. at 4-8; see supra notes 2, 5, and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
210. As the Court indicated in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990),
implied remedy claims require a substantial showing of legislative intent to create a private
right of action because the Court wants to ensure that Congress, rather than the judiciary,
controls the creation of private remedies for violations of federal statutes. Id. at 508 n.9. Sec-
tion 1983 claims under federal statutes do not require such a substantial showing of legislative
intent regarding the statute sought to be enforced because Congress indicated its intent to
permit such enforcement by enacting § 1983. Id.; see supra notes 191-92 and accompanying
text. The fact that the Artist M. Court stirs the § 1983 inquiry regarding enforceable rights
into the implied remedy "pot" is especially dangerous for plaintiffs, in light of the Court's
extreme reluctance-especially in recent cases-to imply a cause of action under federal stat-
utes. See supra note 190.
211. See supra notes 195-210 and accompanying text.
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attempt to avoid by adhering to the principle of "stare decisis et non
quieta movere":21 2 it invites confusion in the lower courts.213 The Court
would have served the lower courts far better by either announcing
clearly that it was rejecting the traditional test for enforceable rights as
articulated in Wilder,2"4 or by explaining that it was addressing Wilder's
three-part test for enforceable rights through its analysis of the legislative
intent of the reasonable-efforts clause.215 In fact, there is a strong argu-
ment that if the Court had followed and applied Wilder's three prongs in
a manner consistent with its previous cases, it would have found the rea-
sonable-efforts provision enforceable under § 1983.216
Lower courts may interpret the Artist M. holding in several ways.
The narrowest reading of Artist M. is that it is a fact-specific decision; as
one lower-court case has already demonstrated,217 a court faced with a
212. "To adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
213. The doctrine of stare decisis represents a judicial policy; "security and certainty re-
quire that established legal principle... be recognized and followed" in cases with facts sub-
stantially similar to those of the precedential case. Id.
214. See supra notes 154-57, 195-210, and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 159-77 and accompanying text.
216. In his dissent to Artist M., Justice Blackmun carefully explained how the Wilder test
should have applied to the reasonable-efforts clause. First, he pointed out that the "plaintiff
children" in Artist M. were "clearly the intended beneficiaries of the requirement that the
State make 'reasonable efforts' to prevent unnecessary removal and to reunify temporarily re-
moved children with their families." Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1372-73 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). Next, Justice Blackmun noted that the Wilder Court rested its holding that the Boren
Amendment created a binding obligation on two factors: (1) the Amendment was "cast in
mandatory" terms, and (2) the Amendment expressly conditioned funding on state compliance
with its provisions, requiring the Secretary of HHS to withhold funds from states not in com-
pliance. Id. at 1372 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to Justice Blackmun, the reason-
able-efforts clause had similar features and thus placed a binding obligation on the state. Id. at
1373 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He noted that neither the defending state officials nor amicus
United States disputed this point. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Blackmun
concluded that the Boren Amendment should not be distinguished from Artist M.'s statute
with regard to the third prong of Wilder's test. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He asserted
that the Boren Amendment did not contain as "objective" a benchmark as the Illinois officials
contended; furthermore, he argued that the Wilder Court had found that the Boren Amend-
ment was not too vague to be enforced, even though Congress had given the states "considera-
ble autonomy in selecting the methods" they would use to calculate what rates are reasonable.
Id. at 1374 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In light of these findings in Wilder, Justice Blackmun
insisted, there was no reason to find that the reasonable-efforts clause was too vague to enforce.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217. Pfoltzer v. Fairfax County Dept. Human Dev., 966 F.2d 1443 (1992) (affirming with-
out opinion grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs' Artist M.-type claim). Of
course, another result of the Artist M. ruling is that the courts that relied on the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Artist M. will be compelled to reverse their verdicts if defendants request
an appeal. See, eg., Winston v. Children & Youth Servs. of Del. County, 948 F.2d 1380, 1387-
88 (1991) (following Artist M.), abrogated by Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2303 (1992).
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suit brought to enforce the reasonable-efforts requirement of the
AACWA under § 1983 undoubtedly will dismiss the claim under Artist
M. 's holding.218 Many courts, however, may not restrict Artist M.'s ap-
plicability to the reasonable-efforts issue or even to all provisions of the
AACWA. One court has already cited Artist M. as the Supreme Court's
most recent word on "when a federal statute confers a right enforceable
through § 1983. "219 Certainly, a court that applies Artist M. to all of its
§ 1983 cases involving federal statutes can do so without changing its
prior approach to these cases too drastically. The court simply can apply
the traditional analysis of § 1983 as used in Wilder and then use Artist M.
as an example of how the Court has interpreted a given § 1983 fact pat-
tern; 220 after all, the Artist M. Court did not overrule Wilder, and, in fact,
presumed to rely partly on Wilder's principles.221
For courts that want to limit the number of federal statutes that
may be enforced under § 1983, however, Artist M. provides powerful am-
munition. Courts may use the case to justify abandoning Wilder's three-
step test for evaluating the enforceable rights issue. Under this reading
of Artist M., these courts can shift a heavier burden onto plaintiffs to
218. Pfoltzer, 966 F.2d at 1443.
219. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 283 (7th Cir. 1992). The Clifton court addressed the
enforceability, under § 1983, of a portion of the Social Security Act; the provision in question
required states to adopt a plan that provides for a system of hearings before reducing the
benefits of a recipient of Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Id at 284. The
court held that this provision, like the reasonable-efforts clause, requires only that the state
"adopt a plan" that meets the statutory requirements. Id. Interestingly, the Clifton court
distinguished Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), from Artist M. by con-
cluding that in Wilder, the Court "held simply that health care providers could sue to enforce
their right to a state plan that did not violate the Boren Amendment." Clifton, 969 F.2d at
285. In contrast, the court continued, Clifton was suing-as had the plaintiffs in Artist M.-
for a "violation of a concededly legal plan." Id.
The Clifton court's interpretation of Wilder seems odd in light of the Wilder Court's
vehemently expressed intention to protect not only the procedural rights of the plaintiffs-the
right to a plan-but their substantive rights as well. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 513-14; see supra note
170 (discussing the conflict between Wilder and Artist M. on the issue of procedural versus
substantive rights under § 1983). Clifton represents the problem with the Artist M. decision
that this Note attempts to address; because Artist M. is so inconsistent with Wilder-reaching
quite different conclusions with regard to very similar facts, see supra notes 154, 216-the
lower courts will have trouble applying both Artist M.'s principles and Wilder's three-part test.
220. This is the approach the Clifton court used. Clifton, 969 F.2d at 283-84. Apparently,
that court did not read Artist M. as a radical departure from traditional § 1983 jurisprudence;
rather, the court simply noted that the Artist M. majority had "based its analysis, in large part,
on the fact that [the statute in question] required only that a state have a plan providing that
the state will make 'reasonable efforts' to prevent" removal and facilitate familial reunion. Id.
at 284 (citingArtist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1367, 1369). The Clifton court stressed Artist M.'s finding
that the AACWA did not define "what 'reasonable efforts' might entail." Id (citing Artist M.,
112 S. Ct. at 1367-69).
221. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1367-68.
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produce evidence of Congress's intent to create a private remedy for vio-
lations of a statute under § 1983. Like the majority in Artist M., courts
so inclined may use a case-by-case approach, rather than the structured
test of Wilder, to preserve their own flexibility in applying § 1983.
Artist M.'s significance lies not only in its departures from tradi-
tional legal analysis;222 the ruling will also have important practical im-
plications, both for the court and the foster care systems. One certain
result will be that the courts will not be burdened with suits brought by
every citizen who thinks a state foster care agency is not trying hard
enough to keep children in their homes and keep families together. As a
consequence, states will retain the freedom to define reasonable efforts
without risking after-the-fact evaluations of their decisions in litigation
by private citizens in litigation. On the other hand, any deterrent effect
reasonable-efforts suits may have had on foster care agencies will be lost
as a result of the Artist M. decision. Children and families utilizing foster
care can no longer bring suit in federal court against state agencies failing
to make the requisite reasonable efforts; now, those parties will have to
rely on the juvenile courts-that determine whether reasonable efforts
have been made in each case22 3-and the Secretary of Health and
Human Services-who can block or diminish funding of states failing to
meet the reasonable-efforts requirement224---to ensure that foster care
agencies consistently make the required reasonable efforts.
Justice Blackmun characterized the alleged deficiencies of the Artist
M. decision in strong terms:
In sum, the Court has failed, without explanation, to apply
the framework our precedents have consistently deemed appli-
cable; it has sought to support its conclusion by resurrecting
arguments decisively rejected less than two years ago in Wilder;
and it has contravened 22 years of precedent by suggesting that
the existence of other "enforcement mechanisms" precludes
[section] 1983 enforcement. At least for this case, it has
changed the rules of the game without offering even minimal
justification, and it has failed to acknowledge that it is doing
anything more extraordinary than "interpret[ing]" the Adop-
tion Act "by its own terms." Readers of the Court's opinion
will not be misled by this hollow assurance. And, after all, we
are dealing here with children.225
As Justice Blackmun indicates, the children who shuffle through the fos-
222. See supra notes 195-216 and accompanying text.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (1988).
224. Id. § 671(b).
225. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1377 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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ter care system every year will bear the brunt-such as it may be-of the
Court's restrained application of § 1983 in Artist M. It remains to be
seen whether other classes of plaintiffs, suing under other federal statutes,
will suffer the same fate under Artist M. remains to be seen. Like a so-
phisticated, specialized tool lying in the garage, Artist M. is available to
judges who want to narrow the scope of § 1983; the question now is
whether they will pick it up and use it.
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